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TRUST AND THE CIVIL LAW
Ignacio Arroyo Martinez*
SCOPE
The trust is the most distinctive institution of the Anglo-Saxon
legal codes. Thus, one can understand the legitimate discomfort that
a jurist foreign to the common law system, and more precisely, a Latin
jurist, experiences in approaching the subject of the trust- especially
before an audience, in good measure, North American.
It is not all strange, therefore, that the first difficulty I en-
countered in preparing for this conference was a didactic or expository
one: to make this presentation suitable for a heterogenous group. How
can one speak on "trust and the civil law" before a mixed audience
of Spanish and North American lawyers without drawing parallels
and without, at times, falling back on sophisticated technicalities? It
is clear to me that had I chosen to analyze the trust with regard
to the law of a particular country, I would run the risk of confusing
the visiting colleagues; but, I am also aware that if I tend toward
a minute dissection of the trust from the standpoint of the civil law,
I must meet the responsibility of presenting an exposition bristling
with details, laden with doctrinal viewpoints apart from jurisprudential
principles, and divorced, finally, from applicable legislation.
It is well known that the trust is not regulated by positive law
in Spain, just as it is not regulated in other European codes, a situa-
tion that is, nevertheless, in contrast with progressive penetration
of that concept in the majority of Latin-American countries.' It is well
* LL.M. Harvard; Professor of Law. Autonomous University of Barcelona.
1. Many scholars have called for the introduction of the trust in countries such
as France. Holland, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy. For an overview of this issue
in the most representative European legal systems, including the Latin as well as
the Germanic systems, see, e.g., R. FRANCESCHELLI, IL TRUST NEL DIRITTO INGLESE (1935);
W.A. PRESTON, ETUDE SUR LES TRUSTS ET TRUSTEES (1904); C. REYMEND, LE TRUST ET LE
DROIT SUISSE 209 (1954); A.F. VAN HALL, TRUST (1896); F. WEISER, TRUSTS ON THE CONTI-
NENT OF EUROPE (1936).
The adaptation of the trust in the Roman law systems has been geographically
localized in the Latin American regions, with Mexico being the pioneer in instituting
the concept, even though its scope has been limited to the banking trust. See R.
BATIZA, EL FIDEICOMISO 76 (3d ed. 1976) (wherein the author gives an explanation of the
primary reasons for the acceptance of that institution in Mexico) [hereinafter cited
as BATIZAI; Peza. Elfideicomiso en )l.Jico in EL FIDEICOMISO EN MPXICO Y SU VIABILIDAD
EN ESPARA 35-37 (Jornadas de Estudio Organizadas por el Banco Nacional de M6xico y
el Banco de Bilbao, Madrid 1980). Gradually the Mexican example has been followed
in the other Latin American countries, among which, in chronological order of the
trust's introduction, are: Colombia, 1923; Chile, 1925; Panama. 1925; Bolivia. 1928 &
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known, secondly, that the Spanish courts have maintained an unex-
plainable silence in regard to the trust, but that there exists, on the
other hand, a line of decisions favoring the fiduciary transaction, which,
although it has not enjoyed unanimous doctrinal support, has permit-
ted an explanation of the difficult problem of the transfer of property
to the fiduciary, the effectiveness of that transfer against third par-
ties, and, therefore, the validity of the fiduciary transaction. On the
other hand, it has not escaped any reasonably informed observer that
writers on this subject do not all subscribe to the double-effect theory
that is, nevertheless, followed by another doctrinal group, which is
joined in its view by the Spanish Supreme Court. All of this naturally
adds new difficulties to the elucidation of the juridical nature or, if
you will permit the expression, to the notion of the trust transplanted
in our law. In addition, it is interesting to note at this point that at-
tention has been drawn to the study of succession problems, principally
to matters concerning the testamentary executor, substitutions in fidei
commissa, testamentary trusts, and the "fiduciary heir" (heredero
fiduciario), this latter institution being typical of Catalonian statutory
law.2 This means that the study of the trust as a general method of
the disposition and administration of property, for acts inter vivos as
well as for acts mortis causa, has occupied, with some exceptions, only
a tangential or peripheral position. Finally, it is likewise very familiar
that the demands of the increase in business dealings, whether com-
mercial or private, indicate the advantage of having legislative in-
tervention in this field for the purpose of resolving, on the one hand,
1955; Peru, 1931; Costa Rice, 1936; El Salvador, 1937 & 1970 (with the promulgation
of the new civil code); Venezuela, 1940 & 1956 (by way of the new trust statute);
Nicaragua. 1940 & 1941; Guatemala, 1946 & 1964 (with the new civil code); Ecuador,
1948; Honduras, 1950. Concerning Panama's law of 1925, see R. ALFARO, EL FIDEICOMISO:
ESTUDIO SOBRE LA NECESIDAD Y CONVENIENCIA DE INTRODUCIR EN LA LEGISLACION DE LOS
PUEBLOS LATINOS UNA INSTITUCION NUEVA, SEMEJANTE AL TRUST DEL DERECHO INGLES (1920).
Strikingly absent from this list are Argentina and Brazil, whose laws do not expressly
regulate the trust, although they do not expressly prohibit it either. In those two
countries, however, there are some special provisions that contemplate concepts related
to the trust, such as, in Argentina, the regulation of debentures which, when issued.
are secured by immovables and in Brazil, the so-called fiduciary alienation for pur-
poses of security approved in 1969 by Law 413.
Some of this data has been taken from the only Spanish monograph on the sub-
ject, although that work is already out of date. P. CLARET Y MARTI, DE LA FIDUCIA Y
EL TRUST (1946) [hereinafter cited as CLARET Y MARTI].
2. Among the many important works on substitutions infidei commissa, see, e.g.,
M. ALBADALEJO, SUSTITUCIONES FIDEICOMISARIAS (1956) [hereinafter cited as ALBADALE.
JOl; V. PUIG FERRIOL, EL HEREDERO FIDUCIARO (1965). Concerning substitutions infidei com-
missa when shares of stock are involved, see Mendndez, Consideraciones sobre la
sustitucidn fideicomisaria de acciones, 512 REVISTA CRITICA DE DERECHO INMOBILIARIO
9-30 (c. 1976) (also published separately in Madrid in 1976 [hereinafter cited as
Mendndez].
1710 [Vol. 42
1982] TRUST and CIVIL LAW 1711
the problems of accommodating the peculiar structure of the trust
and the specific provisions that one encounters in each case, given
the obstacles presented by existing legislation, and resolving, on the
other hand, the speculations or controversies by arriving at a specific
concept of the trust, whether it be in accordance with the banking
trust formula3 or whether it be under the more limited provisions
for the so-called investment trust.
4
I feel that these brief considerations permit me to place suitable
limits on the scope of this paper, by which I will only attempt to
offer some reflections on "the viability *of the trust in civil law
systems" and, more particularly, in Spain. With this focus, I believe
that I have disspelled some of my discomfort, because I can now
discuss the concept and characteristics of the trust with a practical
and immediate purpose: to determine the proper place for that insti-
tution in light of the necessities of its use in Spain.
DEFINITIONS
The definitions that have been given for "trust" are quite
numerous. Before presenting the least controversial one, however, it
3. A respected segment of our doctrinal writers has spoken out in favor of
recognizing the banking trust, weakening, therefore, the requirement that fiduciaries
be limited to credit entities recognized by law. See, e.g., Garrigues, Clausura de las
jornadas de estudio sobre el fideicomiso, in EL FIDEICOMISO EN M9xico Y SU VIABILIDAD
EN ESPAAA (Jornadas de Estudio Organizadas por el Banco Nacional de Mdxico y el Banco
de Bilbao, Madrid 1980); Sanchez Calero, Hacia en reconocimienlo legislativo en Espala,
del fideicomiso, in EL FIDEICOMISO EN MtXICO Y SU VIABILIDAD EN ESPAAA 187, 210 (Jor-
nadas de Estudio Organizadas por el Banco Nacional de M6xico y el Banco de Bilbao,
Madrid 1980).
A comparison of case holdings indicates, in effect, the tendency to limit those
who can serve as fiduciaries to banks and credit entities, thereby making it possible
for the state to exercise more immediate control, through the respective central banks,
over the execution of the duties given to the fiduciary. Because the state establishes
similar mechanisms of control over other entities, such as insurance companies and
other special corporations, it seems reasonable to suggest that such entities be allowed
to qualify as fiduciaries also.,
4. The provisions of the investment trust naturally vary according to the will
of the contracting parties. In general terms one can say that such a trust comprises
a series'of transactions through which the business entity acquires from its client
a sum of money designated for the acquisition of bearer securities that promise to
produce, within a certain period, a determined income or yield. The type of invest-.
ment, the fluctuations in value, the risks of loss, etc. are conditions that are to be
determined in the contract establishing the trust, although it is generally the business
entity which concerns itself with such conditions during a stipulated period of time.
Under Mexican law, for example, there are detailed regulations governing such
transactions by specifying the type of securities that can be acquired on behalf of
the beneficiary, such as those securities approved by the National Commission of
Securities or those guaranteed by the Federal government. For detailed analysis of
this subject, see BATIZA, supra n. 1, at 256 n.89.
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is wise to advance a preliminary observation: a legal or doctrinal defini-
tion is quite a different matter from the diverse meanings given
"trust" in the business world. This point is of interest because it per-
mits the delineation of three aspects which ought to be carefully
distinguished. (1) In the first place, beyond the scope of this analysis
is the economic meaning of trust such as the one arrived at when
the trust is associated with monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic enter-
prise whose purpose is to restrict free competition by collusive prac-
tices, such as the limitation of production quotas, the division of
markets, and price fixing etc., and whose cash reserves, on the other
hand, fall between the purview of the law regulating businesses and
that of antitrust legislation. This is the so-called business trust.' (2)
Excluded from the scope of this analysis is the other broad meaning
of trust that encompasses all legal fiduciary relations, that is to say,
the set of relations between persons that arise by reason of the con-
fidence or trust that one of them engenders or places in the other.
Naturally, under this second limitation, we draw closer to the topic
of concern, in that we are now within the realm of trusts where there
are found statements of principles as heterogeneous as the contracts
of deposit, loan, mandate, and power of attorney or the concepts of
tutorship, testamentary executorship, and agency. All of these are
fiduciary relationships or transactions.' (3) Compared with the economic
aspect of monopoly, and to the wide range of fiduciary relations, our
focus is more limited, it encompasses only the Anglo-Saxon institution
of the trust, that is to say, situations where a person separates a
portion of his patrimony and transfers the ownership of that part with
the stipulation that the person who acquires it must manage it for
the benefit or interest of a third party.' With the trust, therefore,
there is produced a separation or division of the right of ownership
in regard to its administration and its economic benefit in such a way
that a person has the ownership of certain property and, at the same
time, administers it for the benefit of another according to an estab-
lished purpose. One should not find it strange from this' point of view
5. The business trust, frequently referred to as the "Massachusetts trust," due
to its place of origin, involves a hybrid between the joint stock company and the trust,
in which the characteristics and peculiar elements of each institution are mixed together.
The business trust is a common law device created in order to give continuity to the
period during which the trustee, as title holder to the property of the trust, is liable.
N. LATTIN, TilE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 55 et seq. (2d ed. 1971). As the use of the business
trust increased, the device was slowly becoming a powerful instrument for concen-
trating economic control in the hands of monopolies for the pursuit of their objectives.
6. Concerning fiduciary transactions, see J. GARRIGUES, NEGOCIS FIDUCIARIOS EN
DERECHO MERCANTIL 31 et seq. (1955) Ihereinafter cited as GARRIGUESI.
7. A.W. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS (3d ed. 1967).
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that one writer has helpfully asserted that the trust "creates a new
structure in the right of ownership."8
Consequently, there are three parties involved: the settlor who
establishes the trust; the trustee or fiduciary to whom the ownership
is transferred with the stipulation that he administer the property
in favor of a third party; and the beneficiary or fidecommissary (cestui
que trust) who holds the beneficial title to the property, that is to
say, the person who receives the equitable title. This tripartite struc-
ture allows one to understand why the most important point is found
in the fact according to which the trustee does not have the enjoy-
ment or title to the economic advantages of the property, this being
so because the trustee is legally bound to give that enjoyment to a
third party called the beneficiary. The trust implies, therefore, a
peculiar situation by virtue of which a person, who has divided his
patrimony, sets aside some of it in order to constitute a trust, transmit-
ting the corpus to another, not for him to take possession of, but for
him to administer and manage for the benefit of someone else, who
can just as well be the settlor himself. In other words, the institution
of the trust rests upon a division of ownership between ownership
in form, or legal ownership, and ownership in substance, or bonitarian
ownership, a distinction that has its roots in the duality of the English
law which, as we know, distinguishes between the common law title
and the equity title. Legal or formal ownership, then, is subject to
the common law, while ownership in substance, or that to be possessed,
is subject to the laws of equity, that is to say, the fiduciary's title
is protected by the common law courts and the beneficiary's (cestui
que trust's) by the equity courts.'
PURPOSES, ORIGIN, AND DEVELOPMENT
From the standpoint of this initial approach to the question, it
is not at all surprising that the notion of the trust is foreign to the
codes of the Roman law tradition and that it is contrary to strict prin-
ciples of English law, being the most important creation of equity.
As a legal institution, the trust enjoys a secular history dating back
to the thirteenth century, and, according to historical investigations,
it can be proved today, without any risk of error, that the trust was
born in the pursuit of an illegal purpose: the transfer of lands to bogus
8. II J. RODRIQUEZ RODRIQUEZ, TRATADO DE SOCIEDADES MERCANTILES 122 (1947).
9. For a comprehensive bibliography of sources dealing with the evolution, and
eventual merger, of common law and equity, see R. DAVID, LE DROIT ANGLAIS (3d ed.
1975); H. G. HANBURY, ENGLISH COURTS OF LAW (1944).
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intermediaries, avoiding in that way the payment of taxes and the
enforcement of the laws governing mortmain.°
The subsequent development of the trust is characterized by its
accommodation to a diversity of purposes to the point that it is
presently the most universal institution, for, next to the contract, it
is employed for the greatest variety of purposes, thus: from the pro-
tection and care of incompetents, to the distribution of an inheritance
or the preservation of a family estate, to the giving of security for
the transfer of immovable property, or the issuing of bonds; to the
structure of profit-sharing plans for workers, not to mention the many
commercial and financial uses such as investment trusts, guaranteed
trusts and life. insurance, voting trusts, trusts for underwriting pur-
pos*es, and, finally, the international trusteeship, which the United
Nations charter recognizes for the administration of territories and
of which England made such valuable use under her territorial policies
until the process of decolonization began well into the second half of
this century.
FIDUCIARY RELATIONS, MANAGEMENT OF
PROPERTY, AND AUTONOMY OF WILL
Setting aside consideration of the different meanings and various
purposes of the trust, it is certain that that institution has been main-
tained in spite of the merger of common law and equity rules and,
consequently, that the distinction is not only historic, but conceptual
as well. It is wise to recall the definition of the trust proposed by
the American Law Institute and set forth in the Restatement:
A trust . . . is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property,
subjecting the person by whom the title to the property is held
to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of
another person, which arises as a result of a manifestation of an
intention to create it."
There are two aspects of the trust which should be emphasized in
regard to the effects of their viability in Spain: on the one hand, the
fiduciary relation, and on the other, the division of ownership. Both
are centered on a common vertex-the autonomy of the will.
The first aspect clearly presents the need to examine the validity
of fiduciary transactions in our law and, more concretely, in its
establishment in light of the double-effect theory and of Supreme Court
decisions concerning the transferability of ownership or title. In the
10. BATIZA, supra n. 1, at 29 et seq. See also id. at 33 et seq. (wherein the author
discusses the various hypotheses and the origin of the institutions involved).
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS S 2 (1959).
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second aspect, the question is more delicate because it requires an
examination of the management of the property in the trust, that is
to say, the so-called fiduciary title. In both cases, nevertheless, it is
necessary to draw from one principle which is fundamental to all
reasoning in this area: the principle of contractual freedom that
positive Spanish law holds sacred.
In effect, if the trust is not regulated by any rule of private law,
it does not seem at all risky to stand fully in favor of its validity
as furthering the general principle of contractual autonomy expressly
established in Articles 1091 and 1255 of the Spanish Civil Code. The
first article provides that obligations which arise from contracts have
the force of law between the contracting parties and ought to be car-
ried out accordingly (pacta sunt servanda). In conformity with the sec-
ond precept, the contracting parties can establish any agreements,
clauses, and conditions which they consider suitable, with the provi-
sion that such agreements are not contrary to law, to morals, or to
public order. This examination, then, is centered on finding out if the
fiduciary nature of a transaction conflicts with the limits mentioned
or, more precisely, if some legal dispostion exists which prohibits such
transactions, since it does not seem that placing confidence in another
person goes against what is moral or against public order. The problem
is consequently divided into the dual aspects previously pointed out:
the business, or fiduciary, structure of the trust and the nature of
the titles it comprises.
TYPES OF TRUST: FIDUCIARY
TRANSACTIONS MORTIS CAUSA
It should be noted that in no way does this discussion attempt
to link the identity between the trust and the fiduciary transaction.
Nothing is further from the purpose of this paper than such a risky
contention. I intend simply to point out that in order to determine
the possible viability of the Anglo-Saxon trust in Spain one must
necessarily examine the problem of the general concept of the fiduciary
transaction to which the trust is evidently related.
The most authoritative doctrine recognizes that in this type of
transaction the fiduciary is given a legal position superior to and
broader than that derived from the economic objective which he
serves. There is a disproportion between the means and the end which
such a transaction attempts to attain. Simply put, the fiduciary trans-
action transfers ownership in order to obtain a result which, from
the legal point of view, does not require such a transfer.'" Thus, the
12. The structure of the fiduciary transaction has been superbly analyzed and
explained in relation to Spanish law by Professor Jocaquim Garrigues. whose analysis
1982] 1715
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legal effect is more abbreviated and, on occasions, different from that
which would ordinarily follow as a result of the very method of
transfer used. But, it should be pointed out that in this context there
is present a notion of the trust that existed under Roman law, the
true historic antecedent of the fiduciary transactions: the testamen-
tary trust. Briefly, as the great Roman scholar Schulz has pointed
out, the testator ordered that his property be acquired, mortis causa,
by a fiduciary with the purpose that he manage it for a specified
reason, naturally, in accordance with the directions of the de cujus.3
It deals with, then, "entrusting something to the good faith of another"
(fidei alicuius commitere). In principle, that duty is not legal; it is simp-
ly moral. But, when the concept is subject to acts inter vivos, the
transfer is legally guaranteed because its enforcement is entrusted
to the law. The two traditional forms, the guaranteed trust and the
so-called management trust, exhibit a common element: the settlor
places his confidence in the fiduciary. The first involves a transfer
of title with a simple grant of security: the trustee becomes owner
for as long as the debt remains unpaid. The transfer thus serves the
purpose of insuring or guaranteeing the debt. Correlatively, the
management trust involves a transfer of ownership in order for the
fiduciary to perform a management task on behalf of someone else.
So, just as inter-vivos fiduciary transactions do not conflict in prin-
ciple with any legal disposition-reserving a point that will be dis-
cussed later-the execution of such transactions mortis causa does
conflict with a series of precepts recognized in the Civil Code with
respect to the law of successions. An examination of those laws per-
mits one to draw four conclusions. The first concerns the express pro-
hibition of the testamentary trust, at least as it is interpreted by the
most authoritative doctrinal writers, found in paragraph 4 of Article
785: "Those [testamentary dispositions] of which the object is to leave
a person the whole or any part of the inheritance to be applied or
invested in accordance with secret instructions given him by the
testator [shall have no effect]." The second is the indirect nullity that
can affect the entire trust if the testator was unscrupulous in regard
to the legitimes of his forced or legal heirs. The third is derived from
the limits placed on substitutions in fidei commissa. Articles 781 to
788 reflect this deep concern which initiated the Age of
decisively influenced the Supreme Court to favor the validity of the fiduciary transac-
tion in the Decision of May 25, 1944, and confirmed in the Decision of January 28,
1946. On the basis of that jurisprudence, and the underlying doctrine, the fiduciary
transaction could then be distinguished from a simulated transaction, on the one hand.
and from transactions involving bogus intermediaries, on the other. See GARRIGUES,
supra n. 6.
13. L. DIEZ-PICAzo, DiCTAMENES JURIDIcOS 30 (1981) (hereinafter cited as DIEZ-PICAZO].
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Enlightenment-the political daughter of the French Revolution-and
which seeks to avoid the indefinite encumbrance of property. 4 Finally,
in conflict with fiduciary transactions mortis causa is the Civil Code's
distrust of successoral contracts in general. The most plausible declara-
tion of such distrust is found in Article 658, which only recognizes
the law or a testament as forms of postmorten transfer, or Article
1271, which, in regard to future inheritance, recognizes only those
agreements that have as their object the division of an inheritance
in accordance with Article 1056.
THE FIDUCIARY STRUCTURE, THE DOUBLE-EFFECT
THEORY, AND THE ALTERATION OF TITLE
Setting aside the problems of the trust in regard to transfers mor-
tis causa, let us inquire into the protection offered by the trust in
transactions inter vivos. The business structure of the trust in our
law is explained by the double-effect theory.15 According to this ap-
proach, the fiduciary transaction encompasses both the actual transfer
of a real right and the creation of a personal obligation. Through the
first, the fiduciary acquires a type of irrevocable ownership which,
moreover, is effective against third parties. On the other hand, the
personal obligation created has a more limited effectiveness: it has
relative or inter-party effect only, the object of the obligation being
to administer, manage, and oversee-in short, to exercise the right
in a limited way and subsequently to restore the property. to the gran-
tor or to someone he has designated. The criticisms of the double-
effect theory have centered on the injustice found in such a transfer
of ownership when a third party in bad faith takes title to the prop-
erty by virtue of an act of disposition executed by the trustee.'" The
third party knows, or has actual knowledge, that the transferor is
only a trustee, i.e., that he has title to the property because someone
else has trusted him to carry out an act of administration or to fulfill
the purpose of seeing that a debt is secured, and not so that he can
dispose of the property. In addition, the transfer involved in estab-
lishing the trust is designed to produce economic profits for the benefit
of a third person.
In spite of all the criticisms, the jurisprudence of the Supreme
court has been reiterated, in the Decision of February 18, 1965,
upholding the validity of the trust governed by Article 1274 of the
14. ALBADALEJO, supra n. 2, at 104; Mentndez, supra n. 2, at 13 n. 10.
15. See generally Gairrigues. supra n. 6.
16. For De Castro, "the trust, and the theoretical construction of the double ef-
fect which usually accompanies it, was born perfect and complete from the head of
a jurist, in the style of Minerva." F. DE CASTRO, El, NEGOCIO JURIDIcO 708 (1971).
19821 1717
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Civil Code on the basis that it constitutes a contract having a legal
cause and that it effects the transfer of the property to the fiduciary
and is valid as to third parties, it being irrelevant whether or not
the third party is in good or bad faith.
Greater protection is afforded, on the other hand, by the altera-
tion of the right of ownership to the patrimony or property of the
settlor. Because the splitting of ownership or the disparity of title,
which the establishment of the trust creates, occurs within the system
of property law and real rights found in the Civil Code, it is subject
to the provisions on public order. We have already seen how the trust
involves a division of title into legal and bonitarian ownership, the
first in favor of the fiduciary or trustee, the second in favor of the
beneficiary or cestui que trust. But, is that polarity between owner-
ship in form and ownership in substance within the autonomy of the
will? In other words, can the solitary institution of ownership be
separated on a bifurcated level under the protection of contractual
freedom? Moreover, can that agreement be enforced against third par-
ties? This, naturally, requires some explanation.
In the codes inspired by the civil law there exist institutions that
contemplate the possibility of distributing the powers that make up
the right of ownership among various title holders. In order to demon-
strate this point, it is sufficient to consider the category of real rights
and, among those, the real right of possession as to things belonging
to another. Usufruct, right of way, the rights of use and habitation,
emphyteusis, and surface rights permit, in effect, the total or partial
utilization or exploitation of property belonging to someone else and,
in some cases, the appropriation or acquisition of its fruits or income.
In the case of usufruct, for example, there is a distribution of pro-
prietary rights between the naked owner and the usufructuary, giv-
ing rise to a separate allocation of the income from the property. But
the idea that dominates this institution is far from that involved in
the trust. The fundamental difference lies in the fact that the Anglo-
Saxon concept of trust cuts off, or terminates, a particular individual's
ownership. The establishment of a trust affects the right of owner-
ship and not just the range of its powers. By contrast, in a usufruct,
the naked owner alone continues as owner, although some of his
powers under that right have been diminished. It is a matter of a
shared exercise of powers, not of a division of the actual title. For
his part, the usufructuary, or other holder of a real right in the prop-
erty, exercises his right within a contained area, defined with greater
or lesser permanence, but without any impingement on the "territory"
of origin or the source of his power. This explains why the usufruc-
tuary lacks the power to dispose of the property.
The failure of all attempts to explain the trust according to the
1718 [Vol. 42
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institutions of continental law is therefore understandable. A com-
parison between the trust and any institution within continental law
cannot withstand the thrust of severe criticism from either the right
or the left. It is sufficient to consider, in this regard, agency, mandate,
legacy, endowment, independent patrimonial mass, the contract, or
the irregular deposit in order to understand that the rights in prop-
erty forming the object of a trust are not divided, or distributed, ac-
cording to the schemes with which we are familiar.'" As the jurist
Ren6 David has clearly pointed out, when one recognizes the inade-
quacy of the concept of ownership with respect to the traditional rights
of use, fruits, and abuse, one is in a position to begin to understand
the trust. Actually, the trustee is an owner even though his powers
are limited by the act establishing the trust and by the laws of equity
developed by the Chancery Court. In practice, he has the right to
manage the trust property by all acts of administration and disposi-
tion; but, on the other hand, he has neither the use nor the benefit
of the corpus, nor the right to materially destroy it. It is an owner-
ship so special that it never comprised the usus, fructus, or abusus.
It is, instead, an owernship of equity. 8
INCOMPATIBILITY OF THE TRUST: RESTRICTIONS ON
ENCUMBRANCE AND THE PUBLIC REGISTRY
In any case, and by way of summary, it seems reasonable to con-
clude that the trust should not be accommodated under Spanish law
without legislative action, since the difference between bonitarian
ownership, i.e., ownership in substance, and formal ownership, i.e.,
legal ownership or ownership acquired by operation of law, is not
easily reconciled with the unitary notion of ownership under the civil
law. Along with this notion there exist within the Latin codes what
have been aptly called by Pompeyo Claret y Marti as "the enemies
of the trust," to wit: the rules against the indefinite encumbrance of
property and the system of the public registration of land. 9 The ef-
fects of the prohibition against the indefinite encumbrance of property,
as we have seen, tend more toward transactions mortis causa and,
in that respect, I have noted the inappropriateness or invalidity of
the trust. Concerning land registration, a principle so deeply grounded
in countries such as ours, I will not contend that real rights in im-
movables should, under the principle of public faith, be registered in
order to be effective against third parties. And, even with such help
17. For an analysis of each of these concepts in this regard, see BATIZA, supra
n. 1, at 66 et seq.
18. R.' DAVID, LES GRANDS SYSTPMES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAINS 362 (7th ed. 1978).
19. CLARET Y MARTI, supra n. 1. For a similar opinion. see DiEZ-PICAZO, supra n. 13,
at 35.
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from the legislature, I feel that it will be more difficult to find a pro-
cedure for guarding against the attack on the so-called bonitarian
ownership by third parties. On the other hand, I view with greater
hope the viability of the trust and the recognition of its effectiveness
as between the contracting parties.
CONSIDERATION OF THE "LEGE FERENDA" AND CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion,, perhaps it is opportune to ask here what criteria
are available to the courts in order for them to regulate adequately
the trust in Spain. That is to say, should a fiduciary be exclusively
a banking entity; should the transfer establishing the trust have ef-
fect erga omnes; is it possible to separate the corpus of a trust from
the mass of assets in bankruptcy and are special powers of administra-
tion necessary in order to do this; is it proper to establish trusts only
in favor of juridical persons, or in favor of animals and things as well;
must the trustee be appointed at the time the trust is created, or
is it lawful to defer that appointment; is it valid for the trustee to
also be the beneficiary; are contingent, reserved, or secret trusts
desirable; must a trust be established by authentic act, or is an act
under private signature sufficient; can the powers of the trustee be
granted to a third person, or should this be prohibited? Without pro-
posing that there are no other equally important questions, I will offer
here a vote in favor of a concept having confidence as its base, which
is equivalent to a showing in favor of the trust, this notion of con-
fidence resting on the idea of good faith coupled with the secular ex-
perience of English-speaking people, including the Louisiana attorneys
at this Congress. Perhaps the presence of those North Americans may
in some way aid in establishing the institution of the trust in Spain.
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